Can high-inequality developing countries escape absolute poverty? by Ravallion, Martin
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  177i
Can High-Inequality  At any pos;ti'.  rate of
grovvth,  the  higher  the  initial
Developing Countries  ineqiaJity. the lower the-ate
Escape Absolute Poverty?  at which  jncom-pcovu  tty  faJls.
It is possiole  for  ineqJ;.Krity to
be high  enough  to  lead to
Martin Ravallion  rising poverty, despite cj,eod
underlyirig  (rowl.hr-  DrCCS
The World Bank
Policy Research  Department

















































































































dPOLICY  RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 1775
Summary findings
Do the poor face the same prospects for escaping poverty  inequality may see little or no overall growth and little
in high-inequality developing countries as in low-  progress in reducing poverty - or even a worsening on
inequality countries? Is it possible for inequality to be so  both counts. (By the same token, factoring in the growth
great as to stifle prospects of reducing absolute poverty,  effects magnifies the estimated handicap the poor face in
even when other initial conditions and policies are  contracting low-inequality countries.)
favorable to growth?  The data Ravallion uses suggest that such cases do
Household  survey data for developing countries  occur. The precision with which key parameters have
suggest that initial distribution  does affect how much the  been estimated makes it difficult to say with confidence
poor  share in rising average incomes. Higher initial  how common such cases are, but they appear to be in the
inequality tends to reduce growth's impact on absolute  minority. What appear to be the best available estimates
poverty. By the same token, higher inequality diminishes  suggest that about one-fifth of the spells between surveys
the adverse impact on the poor  of general economic  he analyzed were cases in which poverty was rising, yet
contraction.  positive growth in the mean (and hence falling poverty)
Combining this evidence with that from recent  is predicted at zero inequality. Inequality can be high
investigations of inequality's effect on growth, Ravallion  enough to result in rising poverty despite good
finds that, if inequality is high enough, countries that  underlying growth prospects.
would have very good growth prospects at low levels of
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Do the poor  face the same prospects of escaping poverty in high inequality developing
countries as in low inequality countries'?  Is it possible that inequality could sometimes be so high
as to stifle prospects of reducing absolute poverty, even when other initial conditions and policies
are favorable to growth?
There  are  two arguments as to why initial distribution  matters  to  subsequent  rates of
poverty reduction.  The first is that higher inequality may entail a lower subsequent rate of growth
in average income, and hence (it is argued) lower rate of progress in reducing absolute poverty.
I shall call this the "induced-growth argument".  There are two links in this argument, one from
initial distribution to growth. and one from growth to poverty reduction.  On the first, an adverse
effect  of inequality on growth has been explained in various ways, including political-economy
models in which more unequal distributions foster distortionary interventions which (it is assumed)
impede growth, and models of risk-market failure in which more unequal distribution  entails a
higher density of credit-constrained people who are unable to  take  up productive  investment
options. 2 This link has received attention in recent literature and there is supportive evidence from
cross-country comparisons. 3 Argument and evidence on the second link-from growth to poverty
reduction-has had a longer history. 4 A number of recent studies suggest that growth in average
incomes typically reduces absolute income poverty.5
2  See Persson  and Tabellini  (1994), Alesina  and Rodrik (1994), and Benabou  (1996). For a
review of the theory and evidence  as to how inequality  can impede  growth see Bruno  et al., (1996).
3  On the effect of initial inequality  on the rate of growth see Persson and Tabellini (1994),
Alesina  and Rodrik (1994), Clarke (1995), and Deininger  and Squire (1996).
4  For recent reviews  of this literature  see Lipton  and Ravallion  (1995) and Bruno  et al., (1996).
5  On the extent to which growth reduces  absolute  poverty  see World  Bank (1990), Fields (1989),
Squire (1993), Ravallion  (1995)  and Ravallion  and Chen (1997).
2There  is a second argument linking initial distribution  to the rate of poverty reduction.
This argument has received less attention.  Even if initial distribution  is irrelevant to the rate of
growth,  it may matter greatly to how much the poor share  in that growth.  Assume a growth
process  in which  all  levels of income grow at roughly  the same rate.  (Amongst developing
countries, recent changes in inequality have had virtually zero correlation with rates of growth,
so this assumption is defensible; see Ravallion and Chen,  1997.)  Higher inequality will then entail
that the poor gain less in absolute terms from growth;  the poor will have a lower share of both
total  income and  its increment through growth;  thus the rate of poverty reduction (for a wide
range  of  measures)  must  be  lower.  At  maximum  inequality-when  the  richest  person  has
everything-absolute  poverty  will  be  unresponsive  to  growth.  By the  same  token,  lower
inequality will mean that the poor bear a larger share of the adverse impact of aggregate economic
contraction.  Low inequality will then be a mixed blessing for the poor; it helps them share in the
benefits of growth, but it also exposes them to the costs of contraction. I call this the "growth-
elasticity argument".6
This paper is mainly concerned with testing the growth-elasticity argument, though it will
throw some new light on the induced-growth argument, and it will explore implications of both.
The following section outlines the testable hypothesis implied by the "growth-elasticity argument"
and provides a test.  Section 3 then brings the two arguments together to examine how initial
distribution influences progress in reducing poverty.  Section 4 concludes.
6  There is a small literature  on the decomposition  of changes  in poverty  into  "growth"  and
"distributional"  effects (Kakwani, 1993;  Datt  and Ravallion,  1992). In this context  one can identify  and
measure  a "growth  elasticity"  of standard  poverty  measures  with respect  to changes  in the mean of the
distribution  on which they are based. However,  this literature  has not examined  the dependence  of these
elasticities  on initial  distribution.
32  The hypothesis and test
It is impossible to predict in the abstract how differences between countries in a measure
of overall  inequality,  such  as the Gini  index, will influence the growth  elasticity  of poverty
reduction  for any specific measure of poverty, such as the proportion of the population living
below a poverty line.  The outcome will depend on precisely how distribution  varies between
countries and over time, as well as the specific properties of the poverty measure. Consideration
of some special cases can be illuminating. 7 However, robust theoretical generalizations would
seem well out of reach.  What I am after here is a data-consistent empirical generalization of the
relationship.
The hypothesis to be tested is that, as inequality increases, the rate of poverty reduction
becomes  less responsive  to growth  in average  income,  and  reaches zero  at sufficiently  high
inequality.  Assuming that the elasticity of poverty reduction to growth falls linearly as inequality
increases, and reaches zero when the richest person has all of the income, the rate of reduction
in poverty can be written:
r  =  p(l  - I)g  (p>O)  (1)
where I  is a measure of initial inequality and g  is the rate of growth in mean income. Thus the
rate of poverty reduction is directly proportional to the "distribution-corrected" rate of growth,
(1 - I)g.
7  For example,  Kakwani  (1993) derives  formulae  for the elasticities  of various poverty measures
with respect to growth in the mean, holding  the Lorenz  curve constant. He also considers  one special
case in which the Lorenz curves shift by a constant  proportion  of the difference  between  the line of
equality  and the Lorenz curve. Suppose  that distribution  does not change over time, but differs
between  countries in the way Kakwani  assumes. Then, from Kakwani's  formulae for the "growth
elasticities"  it can then be shown that the (absolute)  elasticity  of certain poverty  measures  (including,
for example,  the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke,  1984, index)  with respect to the mean of the distribution  will
be decreasing  in the Gini index when the poverty line is less than the mean of the distribution.
4To test the hypothesis against a more general (ad hoc) nonlinear alternative, I estimated
the following encompassing model, including an error  term:
r  =  P(l  - I)g  + Yo + Yg  + Y2g2 +  y 3I
(2)
+ y412 + y5g1 2 + y6g21  + Y7g212 + E
where E is an innovation error.  Equation (1) implies the testable restrictions on (2) that y, = 0 for
all  i.  However, (2) is flexible enough to allow a wide range of alternatives, including that initial
inequality is irrelevant,  and only growth matters (y,  = 0  for all  i s  I and  0  0).  It also allows
nonlinearity in the way inequality affects the growth elasticity.
To  test the  hypothesis in  (1) I will be using data for 41  spells constructed  from  two
household  surveys over  time,  for 23 developing countries. 8 The two surveys  use the same
welfare indicator (so one does not compare a consumption-based measure of inequality at one date
with an income-based measure at another).  All distributions are based on consumption or income
per person, and are household-size weighted (so all fractiles are of persons not households). All
rates of change are compound annual rates (annualized differences  in logs gave similar results.)
The  poverty  measure  is the  proportion  of  the  population  living  below  $1.50/day  at  1993
international prices. 9 All currency conversions used the consumption PPP rate from Penn World
Tables 5.6.  The poverty measure is intended to be "absolute" in that the poverty line has constant
real value  both across  countries (based on the PPP exchange  rates) and over time  (based on
8  Further details on the data can be found  in Ravallion  and Chen (1997), who use these data to
describe  how poverty and distribution  have been changing  in the developing  world, and what the
empirical  relationship  is amongst  these  variables  (though they do not examine the issue of this paper).
9  This is equivalent  to $1/day at 1985  prices; this is the average level of poverty lines found in
low-income  countries;  see World  Bank (1990, Chapter  2) and Ravallion  et al., (1991), for further
discussion.
5country-specific  CPIs).  (It does not reflect, for example, any effect of rising average  levels of
living on the perception of what constitutes "poverty"  in a given country.) The inequality measure
is the Gini index.  The growth rate is the annualized rate of change in the survey mean." 0 Though
care has gone into setting up this data set from the primary sources, it is undeniably "noisy" data;
there are underlying differences in survey methodology between countries and over time that one
cannot possibly eliminate (though by focusing on rates of change, noncomparabilities which take
the form of proportionate country-level fixed effects will be eliminated.)
A joint F-test on the OLS estimate of (2) could not reject the null hypothesis that y, = 0 for
all i. "  The restricted form is:'2
r  = 4.435 (1 -I)g  + residual  (3)
(4.695)
with an R 2 of 0.355.  Figure  1 plots equation (3) and the data.  There  is a large unexplained
variance, though at least some of this is measurement error.
'°  This is almost  certainly  a better measure  for this purpose  than (say) the private  consumption
component  of the national  accounts;  both sources  entail measurement  errors but for the survey mean  the
attenuation  bias will be offset by a bias in the opposite  direction  due to the use of a common  survey  to
estimate  both the poverty  measure  and the growth  rate; indeed,  under certain  conditions  the two sources
of bias will be exactly  offsetting  (Ravallion  and Chen, 1997). Using  the national  accounts,  however,  will
give the attenuation  bias only, which  could be large  given  the imperfect  matching  between  survey dates
and the accounting  periods for the national  accounts.
"  The value of F(8,32)  = 1.467, which is significant  at only the 21 % level; similarly  the LM tests
gave Chi-square(8)  = 11.003,  significant  at the same level.
12  The t-ratio is based on the OLS standard  error. If one interprets  the following  equation as the
first difference  of an equation  for the log of the poverty  measure  which  has a white  noise error term then
there will be non-zero  off diagonal  elements  in the error covariance  matrix. If one allows for this in
estimating  the standard  error, the t-ratio rises slightly  (to 4.76). If one also allows for any general type of
heteroscedasticity,  the robust  t-ratio falls to 4.26. So such corrections  make little difference  here.
6However, there were other null hypotheses which could not be rejected as restricted forms,
including y, = 0 for all i  t  I and P = 0 .'3  Under this null, it is only the growth rate that matters.
If one lets the distribution-corrected  growth rate and the ordinary growth rate fight it out in one
regression one obtains:
r  =  16.096(1  - 1)g  - 6.663g  + residual  (4)
(2.1 89)  (-1.596)
Though  there  is clearly a strong correlation  between these two variables,  this  regression  still
suggests that it is the distribution-corrected mean which matters more to poverty reduction than
the ordinary mean.  Equation (3) is a statistically acceptable restricted form of (4).
I repeated  the analysis replacing the proportion of people living below $1.50/day  by  a
distribution-sensitive  poverty  measure (for the same poverty  line),  namely the  Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke  (1984) index based on  squared poverty gaps.  The same qualitative results  were
obtained, though the estimated value of  ,B  rose to 8.098 (with a t-ratio of 3.90514).
3  Combining  the  "induced-growth"  and  "growth-elasticity"  arguments
The above results indicate that higher inequality tends to entail a lower rate of poverty
reduction at any given positive rate of growth.  Equation (3) suggests that the growth elasticity
declines sharply as inequality increases.  At the lowest Gini index in the sample (0.25) the growth
13  The F-test was F(8,32)=1.761  and the LM test gave  Chi-square  (8)=12.532;  both would  only
reject the null at the 12%  level.
14  In this case, the correction  for heteroscedasticity  and non-zero  off-diagonal  elements  in the
covariance  matrix (using the method  described  in footnote 12)  made more  difference  to the standard
error;  the reported  t-ratio here is based  on the corrected  standard  error; without  corrections,  the t-ratio
was 2.45.
7elasticity  is 3.33, while  at the highest  Gini index (0.59) it is 1.82. At the mean Gini index  (0.41),
the growth elasticity  of the poverty reduction is 2.62.
As noted  in the Introduction,  there is also evidence  that higher inequality  results in a lower
rate of growth. To bring these two sources  of evidence  together, let us follow  past specifications
used in the growth literature and write the rate of growth as:
g  =g 0 +1I+v  (6<0)  (5)
where go is the expected rate of growth at zero inequality  and v is an innovation  error.  The
expected  rate of poverty reduction (conditional  on g0 and I ) is then:
_=  Pg 0 + P(O-go),  - 2 (6)
This is strictly  decreasing  (increasing)  in I as long as the rate of growth  at zero inequality  is above
(below)  6 ( I - 2  I).  And F is strictly convex in I  (for 8 < 0 and  3  > 0  ).  Figure 2 depicts the
relationship  implied  by (6).
If gO>  O  and I ￿  0.5  then  poverty  will fall, and at a faster  rate the lower  the inequality. The
same difference in inequality will matter more to the rate of poverty reduction amongst low-
inequality  countries  than amongst  high-inequality  countries. For go> 0 but I>  0.5,  it is possible
for inequality  to be sufficiently  high that the rate of growth becomes  negative  and poverty rises,
as indicated  by the upper dashed line in Figure 2; this requires  that 6 < -go (implying  that the left
derivative  of the RHS of (6) w.r.t. I is positive  at 1= 1), and poverty  will be rising  (in expectation)
for I  in the interval (-go/ 6 , 1) . For g0<  0 and I Ž 0.5,  r  must be strictly increasing  in I;
however, if 6 < go then r  will be decreasing  in I at sufficiently  low inequality  (Figure 2) .
8So the value of 6 is crucial.  What is the evidence on this?  There are clearly many other
factors determining the rate of growth,  including the initial income level,  initial human capital,
and the policies pursued.  Controlling  for these factors, Clarke (1995) estimates that 6 = -0.07
( i.e.,  a one percentage point increase in the Gini index results in about a 0.07 percentage point
decrease in the annual rate of economic growth).  The growth regressions in Deininger and Squire
(1996) suggest a similar value of 6 = -0.05,  on a data set different to Clarke's  in many respects.
Both estimates are significantly different from zero at the 5 % level or better.
These estimates of  -6  are sufficiently high to suggest that, once the impact of inequality
on growth is factored in, even countries with relatively good growth prospects (at low inequality)
will see contraction and rising poverty at sufficiently high levels of inequality.  Returning to the
data used  in the previous  section,  and using the Deininger-Squire  estimate of  6,  I found that
g0> 0 (in expectation) for 33 of the 41 spells.'5 In 24 of those 33 spells, poverty was falling (the
growth rate was positive in 26 cases); so in nine cases the data are in the region with go > 0 but
rising poverty.  Using the Clarke estimate of  6 instead the result is unchanged;'6 again go > 0 in
33 cases, and these were the same 33, so again nine had rising poverty.
However, there is (of course) statistical imprecision in the estimate of -6  and (hence) g0.
If instead one sets 6 = -0.03  (one standard error above the Deininger-Squire point estimate), then
the number of spells for which go > 0  and yet poverty was rising drops from nine to three.
15  This is the expected  value  of go, given  by g - 61. The mean value of go is 2.8%  per annum,
though the variance  is high, with a standard  deviation  of 6.2%.
16  Though  the mean go is of course  higher,  at 3.6%.
94  Conclusion
Household survey data for developing countries suggest that initial distribution does matter
to how much the poor share in rising average incomes; higher initial inequality tends to reduce
the impact of growth on absolute poverty.  By the same token, higher inequality diminishes the
adverse impact on the poor of overall contraction.
Further interpretation is possible when one combines this evidence with that from recent
investigations  of  the impacts of  inequality on  growth.  One then  finds that,  if  inequality  is
sufficiently  high,  countries  which  would have very  good  growth prospects  at  low  levels of
inequality may well see little or no overall growth, and little progress in reducing poverty, and
even a worsening  on both counts.  (And, by the same token,  factoring in the growth  effects
magnifies the estimated handicap that the poor face in contracting low-inequality countries.)  The
data used here suggest that such cases do occur.  The precision with which key parameters have
been estimated makes it difficult to say with confidence how common such cases are, although
they do  appear  to be in the minoritty.  What would appear to be the best available estimates
suggest  that about one fifth of the spells between surveys analyzed here were cases  in which
poverty was rising, yet positive growth in the mean (and hence falling poverty) is predicted at zero
inequality.  Inequality can be sufficiently high to result in rising poverty despite good underlying
growth prospects.
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12Figure  1: Rate  of poverty  reduction  against
distribution-corrected  rate of growth
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